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-CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A vast amount of literature has been centered around the structure 
and processes of memory. A number of theorists and researchers (cf. 
Underwood, 1969; Nelson & Brooks, 1974) conceptualize memory in terms 
of attributes or distinctive features. Underwood (1969) has presented 
in detail some of these attributes. They include a temporal and a 
spatial attribute by which one determines when and where an event 
occurred, a frequency attribute by which one tells how often an event 
occurred, a modality attribute indicating which sense(s) experienced 
the event, and several attributes pertaining mainly to verbal or ver-
bally mediated events; orthographic, associative non-verbal, and 
associative verbal attributes. The orthographic attribute describes 
the shape and spelling characteristics of the word in memory. The 
associative non-verbal attribute deals with acoustic, affective, and 
contextual information about the word. The associative verbal attri-
bute places the word with respect to its taxonomic characteristics and 
a stable network of associations. These attributes are encoded with 
the word in order to fit the word into the existing structure of memory 
and to provide the necessary information to correctly decode the memory 
trace during retrieval. According to Underwood (1969), these attri-
butes serve to "discriminate one memory from another and to act as 
retrieval mechanisms for a target memory." 
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Madigan (1974) has used differences between taxonomically cued 
and uncued recall to identify those aspects of attributes involved only 
in the retrieval processes. The cuing properties of the attributes are 
thought by many, including Madigan, to provide access to higher order 
units in which a target item is stored. These higher order units are 
the cognitive structure or organization that are imposed on individual 
items to facilitate storage and retrieval. This structure may be al-
ready existing in semantic memory, e.g., categories, or may be based 
on the contiguity of the items in a single episode. This structure 
must then be accessed in order to retrieve the individual items. The 
exact mechanism which performs this accessing is as yet undetermined. 
There are several mathematical models currently in use which hope 
to explain this,accessing process. This paper presents some of the 
theoretical foundations of the mathematical models and tests the pre-
dictions of these models in multiple cuing situations. 
Bahrick's Generation-Recognition Model 
2 
According to Bahrick (1969), cues help the person generate possible 
responses from semantic memory and leaves the person with the task of 
recognizing one of the generated responses as the target. The proba-
bility of recall of the target in cued recall is the product of the 
probability of its implicit generation and the probability that it is 
recognized (Bahrick, 1970). The cues may be implicit, such as the 
recall of actual portions of targets found by Brown and McNeill (1966) 
with the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon. They state that subjects give 
themselves cues as to the identity of the target word by recalling 
features of the target, such as the first letter, the number of syllables, 
and the general sound of the word. As in the case of Bahrick (1969), 
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the cues may also be explicitly presented by the experimenter. Further-
more, Bahrick (1969) says that cuing taps only the retrieval processes 
and not storage. This might imply that all attributes are represented 
automatically in the storage process since in order for storage of 
attributes to have an effect during retrieval, all attributes must be 
available for accession of the target memory. Or, this might imply 
that the question of storage of attributes is irrelevant to what happens 
in retrieval if the assumption is made that retrieval and storage are 
unrelated processes. 
Tulving's Principle of Encoding Specificity 
A somewhat opposing view of retrieval processes is expressed by 
Tulving and his associates in their principle of encoding specificity. 
It states that the properties of the memory trace of a word 
event are determined by specific encoding operations performed 
on the input stimuli; and that it is these properties, rather 
than the properties of the word in semantic memory, that deter-
mine the effectiveness of any given $timulus as a retrieval cue 
for the event. The principle suggests that if a stimulus in 
the retrieval environment renders possible or facilitates recall 
of the target word T, the retrieval information was appropriate 
to or compatible with the information contained in the episodic 
trace of T. Converse~y, if a particular stimulus is ineffective 
in retrieving a particular trace, the conclusion follows that 
the appropriate relation was lacking. (Tulving, 1974, p. 778-
779) 
This suggests several things. First, what is stored determines what 
retrieval cues are effective in accessing memory. Second, the cuing 
task relies solely on the episodic properties of the target. Finally, 
there is an unbreakable bond between encoding and retrieval processes. 
While Tulving does not deny the possibility that there is a multiple 
encoding of attributes, he is careful in his own research not to make 
the assumption that any particular attribute is encoded. 
In order to test the encoding specificity principle, Thomson and 
p;: 
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Tulving (1970) presented a list of words to be remembered with a weakly 
associated input cue accompanying each word. This cue, during retrieval, 
allowed access to the representation of the item in memory presumably 
by increasing recall of the higher order units and of the contents of 
those higher order units. Cues that were not specifically encoded, 
even though normally more effective, were much less successful in pro-
viding access to the list word representation. It is possible that by 
providing an input cue and the instructions that the cue would help the 
subject remember the target, Thomson and Tulving directed the encoding 
of the word away from its more popular interpretation and into a more 
unusual interpretation. For instance, if CHAIR was the target and 
COMFORT was the input cue, an output cue of TABLE, which is normatively 
a higher associate of CHAIR than is COMFORT, would be relatively in-
effective since the list representation of CHAIR would more likely be 
associated with the category of "things that are comfortable" than with 
the category "pieces of furniture". 
Postman (1975a) has raised additional arguments against the gen-
eralizability of the encoding specificity principle. He suggested 
that Thomson and Tulving's results were at least partly due to expec-
tations that the input cue would be made available to the subject at 
recall. These expectations were based on a series of set-inducing 
lists given to familiarize the subject with the procedure and to spe-
cifically maximize the probability that the target would be encoded in 
terms of the accompanying input cue. Postman modified Thomson and 
Tulving's technique by eliminating the set-inducing lists and by using 
a mixed list procedure with both strong and weak cues available for 
some of the words at input and output. With this modification, Postman 
p 
found that although recall was in general higher when the cues were 
the same at input and output, "regardless of the condition of input 
cuing, strong output cues were substantially more effective than weak 
ones." Postman's (197Sa) study presents some evidence that the exten-
sive use of the weak input cues was primed by the use of set-inducing 
lists and that without this priming, the principle of encoding speci-
ficity fails to predict accurately. 
However, despite the methodological questions raised for the 
Thomson and Tulving (1970) article, there is support nonetheless for 
the notion that cuing increases the recall of higher order units and 
their contents. Lewis (1974) presented lists of taxonomically related 
words in a categorically blocked or unblocked manner. Category names 
or category items not included in the lists were presented as cues. 
For both blocked and unblocked lists more items were recalled in the 
cued recall task than in the free recall task. This effect was mainly 
due to the increased accessing of the higher order units, in this case 
categories. 
Cues themselves may act to either facilitate or hinder recall of 
a target. For cuing to have a positive effect, the cue must facili-
tate both the access~ng of the higher order units and their contents 
5 
or else facilitate one and have a neutral effect on the other. This 
point is supported by evidence that recall of category items may be 
reduced by using list items as cues for the remainder of the list 
(Roediger, 1973). This method facilitates access to the higher order 
units by providing some category information but disrupts recall of the 
contents of the higher order units by reducing the number of responses 
within the category that are still recallable. The organization of 
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the list items at input is disrupted by the system of cuing. 
Lauer (1974) presented a list of words either in random order or 
organized alphabetically or taxonomically. Then she gave output cues 
either consistent or inconsistent with the input organization. Recall 
was best when input organization and output cues were the same and 
taxonomic cues facilitated recall more than alphabetic cues. Therefore, 
in order to facilitate retrieval with cues, the organization imposed 
on the output by the type and ordering of the cues must be compatible 
with the input organization. 
Cuing from the Associative Verbal Attribute 
Probably the most discussed attribute in the cuing literature is 
the associative verbal attribute. This attribute is represented by 
taxonomic information and the type of associative information tapped 
in word association norms. Unlike orthographic and acoustic informa-
tion, associative information about a word cannot be given as a single 
unit. A word may, and often does, have a number of meanings and the 
more frequently a word appears in the language the more meanings and 
associations the word is likely to have (Reder, Anderson, & Bjork, 
1974). 
A number of contemporary studies (e.g., Winograd & Conn, 1971) 
have looked at this multiplicity of meanings and associations in connec-
tion with specific encoding and retrieval cues. As was noted earlier, 
Thomson and Tulving (1970) found that normally high level associates 
were not effective retrieval cues when a different lower level assoc-
iate was presented with the target word at encoding. They concluded 
that the high level associate was not encoded with the target. This 
conclusion has been given support by others (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 
p 
1973; Tulving, 1974). 
Light and Carter-Sobell (1970) presented homographs ,.;ith an accom-
panying adjective which biased the encoding toward one semantic context 
or the other. Using a recognition task, they presented the noun only, 
the noun plus the input adjective, the noun plus an adjective biased 
toward the same semantic context, or the noun plus an adjective provid-
ing a different semantic context. They found better recognition for 
homographs with the same semantic context than with differing semantic 
contexts. Light and Carter-Sobell felt that recognition is similar to 
cued recall in which the cue is the phonological representation and 
concluded that "recall, unless it is cued, gives S no hint of which 
memory representations are appropriate ones to examine." Therefore, if 
a different meaning is cued at recall than the one that was encoded, 
the wrong memory representation may be found and the target will not be 
recognized. 
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Reder, Anderson, and Bjork (1974) gave further evidence that within 
the associative verbal attribute recall and recognition depend on the 
semantic interpretation. They assumed that, based on the fact that high 
frequency words have more associates than low frequency words, high 
frequency words also have more semantic interpretations and are more 
affected by changes in cues between encoding and retrieval. Reder et 
al. presented a list of high and low frequency words each with a weakly 
associated input cue. The subject was then asked to recall the targets 
given either the input cue, a strongly associated cue, or no cue. 
Since the input cue and strongly associated cue were more likely to tap 
the same semantic interpretation in the low frequency words than in the 
high frequency words, they expected that differences in recall with 
p 
these types of cues would be greater for the high frequency words than 
for the low frequency words. They found that recall with the weakly 
associated input cue exceeded recall with the strong extralist cue by 
an average of 32.5% for high frequency words compared with 9% for low 
frequency words. They concluded that recall depends on recognition of 
the specific interpretation of the word originally encoded. 
Tulving and Thomson (1973) had previously shown that words later 
recalled were not able to be recognized from among subject generated 
associations to strong associates not specifically encoded with the 
targets. In that study subjects, following encoding of target words 
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and a weakly associated input cue, were required to generate associa-
tions to strong associates of the previously encoded targets and then 
circle any target words among the associations they had just generated. 
For example, if one of the targets was, in fact, TABLE, the subjects 
would be asked to generate associations to the word CHAIR (e.g., SOFA, 
TABLE, and SIT). Then the subjects would be asked to circle any of 
their responses that had been in the list they had seen earlier. If 
TABLE had been one of the generated associations and the subject circled 
it, the word was counted as having been recognized. While, in fact, 
the target items were often generated, they were seldom recognized using 
this procedure. However, Reder et al. (1974) in a second experiment, 
modified Tulving and Thomson's technique by using a 4-alternative forced 
choice recognition task and found that for low frequency words which had 
fewer semantic interpretations, recognition of targets from among the 
generated words was 84% as compared with 38% for high frequency words. 
They interpreted these findings to mean that for high frequency words 
the semantic interpretation given to the target within the generated 
words was more likely to be different from the original encoding than 
the semantic interpretation for low frequency words. 
An issue of importance to the interpretation of the findings of 
Tulving and Thomson (1973) is the question of how the semantic similar-
ity among the responses generated to the strong extralist cues affects 
the ability of the subject to discriminate between targets and dis-
tractor responses in the recognition task. Postman (1975b) suggested 
that in the generation task the subjects responded with words that are 
not only closely related to the strong associate of the target, but 
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also closely related to each other. When asked to circle any target 
items from among the generated words, this semantic similarity would 
make the recognition task quite difficult. When a forced choice pro-
cedure was used in Tulving and Thomson's study, the number of items 
recognized more than doubled, suggesting a more relaxed decision cri-
terion. On these grounds it might be suggested that the reason Tulving 
and Thomson found recall superior to recognition was that they had arti-
ficially forced the criterion for deciding that a generated item was 
from the list above the criterion used by the subject in the recall task. 
Postman (1975a) was able to raise the raw recognition rate in yet 
another way. Instead of generating four or six associations for each 
word, his subjects generated only two associations. When only two 
associations were generated, recall was no longer superior to recogni-
tion of the targets from among the generated items. Two semantically 
similar responses left the subject with an easier recognition task than 
did four or six semantically similar responses, giving further support 
for Postman's assertion that semantic similarity between generated 
targets and distractors impedes recognition. 
F 
Tulving (1974) questioned the notion of semantic interpretation as 
an explanation of why normally high associates failed as retrieval cues. 
He used as input cues either the target itself, a low level associate 
unrelated to the high level associate used in his generation task, or 
a word that was congruous with the high level associate. For example, 
if the target was COAT, Tulving would use as his input cue either COAT, 
COVERING (a low level associate unrelated to the high level extralist 
cue LINING), or CLOTH (an associate of both the target and the extra-
list cue). This set of words congruous with the high level associates 
was generated by Tulving himself. Following list presentation, half 
the words were cued with high level associates and then for the other 
half of the list subjects were to generate four free association re-
sponses to the high level associates of the targets and then recognize 
any target words in their associations. In a second experiment the 
order of these two tasks was reversed. Finally, a cued recall task 
using the input cues was given. In the first experiment subjects per-
formed much better on the extralist cuing task than on the recognition 
task but this effect was reversed in the second experiment, implying 
that there is an order effect. Also there was a statistically non-
significant effect of extralist cues being more effective for congruous 
input cues over the other input cues. Recall with extralist cues was 
worst for words with no input cue. 
In general, Tulving had difficulty explaining his results, espec-
ially the order of task effect. He concluded on the basis of the non-
significant effect of congruous over incongruous input cues in the 
extralist cuing task that either the semantic interpretation of encod-
ing is incorrect or else the "congruous encoding conditions were not 
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congruous enough." This latter interpretation of Tulving's data is 
made all the more likely by his non-normative generation of cues con-
gruous with the extralist cues. 
The most surprising finding in Tulving's (1974) study is that ex-
tralist cues were least effective for those targets using the target 
word itself as the input cue. It was expected that the most frequently 
used meaning, which was supposedly tapped by the high level extralist 
cue, would be the meaning naturally encoded with the target (Light & 
Carter-Sobell, 1970; Winograd & Geis, 1974). Again, a methodological 
problem may provide the answer. Tulving (1974) suggests that the use 
of the target as cue may have induced subjects to encode the target 
solely in terms of its phonetic characteristics and because it was 
processed on such a low level, the semantic information provided by the 
extralist cue was less appropriate for these words. In any case, it is 
not clear that this result is typical of what happens normally in 
encoding and retrieval. 
Multiple Cued Rec~ll 
Previously, encoding has been discussed in terms of single attri-
butes, one at a time. Some' of the findings discussed above seem to 
indicate that, within the associative verbal attribute, encodings may 
11 
be limited to a single meaning at a time and that only cues congruous 
with that meaning are at all effective. Wickens (1970) suggested that 
words are encoded multiply and automatically. Underwood (1969) asserts 
that multiple attributes allow more than one path to a target memory. 
Nelson and Hill (1974) showed that the more opportunities to encode an 
item, the more encodings were made, and the better the stimulus was 
retrieved. Winograd and Geis (1974) used this same encoding variability 
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principle in their study of homographs with equally probable or differ-
entially probable interpretations and got results consistent with Under-
wood's suggestion. But neither of these studies specifically tested 
Underwood's assertion about multiplicity of retrieval paths across 
attributes. 
One of the first studies to look at several attributes at once was 
Bregman (1968). Target words were presented serially with cues given 
within a continuing list. Cues were either graphic, phonetic, semantic, 
or a word contiguous with the target in the list. He found that the 
graphic cue was most effective when one, two, or three items intervened 
and the semantic cue was most effective when 24, 48, or 96 items inter-
vened, implying that the amount of to be remembered material determines 
which cue is most efficient. 
The present study was able to examine whether an associative, or 
semantic, cue has an advantage in effectiveness over a rhyme cue, which 
has both graphic and phohetic cue characteristics, at a delay compar-
able to that found in Bregman's 96-intervening items condition. There 
is a basic difference in the type of intervening material found in 
Bregman's task and the present experiment. While Bregman's subjects 
continued to view words and, presumably, organize them into some easily 
rememberable structure, in the present study only a limited number of 
to be remembered items follow (at most 14) and a mathematical task in-
tervenes. This mathematical task is .E£E_ force less verbal and may 
provide less specific interference than Bregman's continuing list. 
Also, with fewer items to be organized, the semantic characteristics 
may be less heavily relied on than with tasks involving many words and 
fewer good bases for organization. 
jP 
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There is, in fact, evidence for equal utilization of sensory and 
semantic characteristics as cues in recall of moderate length lists. 
Nelson and Brooks (1974) found no difference in cuing effectiveness of 
rhymes and synonyms when the pre-experimental probabilities of assoc-
iation and response set sizes had been equated. Both high and low 
levels of response probability were used for the rhyme and synonym cues. 
There were few intrusion errors at either level. If subjects were 
merely generating responses to the cues and giving the most probable 
response, then one would expect many intrusion errors for those cues 
with low probabilities of association. Their study was unable to dis-
tinguish between the possibility of the memory trace of a target being 
a single multifeatured representation or a number of single-featured 
representations because of the way their lists were constructed. They 
were able to establish, however, that sensory attributes can be func-
tionally as important as semantic attributes in the representation(s). 
As such, Nelson and Brooks give support for the encoding specificity 
principle provided that multiple encoding takes place; and to the 
generation-recognition model, by virtue of the small number of intru-
sion errors in the low association responses. Clearly subjects compare 
the generated responses and recognize any targets. 
While a word is encoded into a number of features each of which may 
be used singly to access the word in memory, often more than one feature 
at a time is used to reineegrate the target memory. Brown and McNeill 
(1966) in studying the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon gave some evidence 
that an almost complete recall of an item in memory consists of being 
able to recall various features of the item but either not being able 
to integrate them into a meaningful response or integrating them into 
p 
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an incorrect response that shares features with the correct response. 
Using only the associative verbal attribute, McLeod, Williams, and 
Broadbent (1971) compared the effects of one and two retrieval cues on 
recall. Unlike Tulving and his associates, McLeod et ~l. gave no input 
cues with the list, thus avoiding the possibility of biasing the en-
coding toward one semantic encoding or another. Both associative cues 
were highly associated with the target response and were unassociated 
with each other. The target list was presented, followed by free re-
call. For each unrecalled word, first one cue was given and if still 
unrecalled, both cues were presented together. The two cues together 
facilitated recall much more than the single cue. McLeod et al. 
suggested that there might be an interaction between the two cues such 
that together they might produce a response, whereas the cues separ-
ately might not. 
Independence of Cues in Multiple Cued Recall 
Cues sometimes give information that is used independently of that 
given by other cues. Galbraith (1975) looked at the frequency attri-
bute and a form of the associative verbal attribute to determine whether 
these two types of information could be used independently to make 
decisions about a target item. Pairs of words were designated correct 
or incorrect and presented one, two, four, or eight times within the 
list. Subjects were then asked to either select the most frequent of 
two pairs or state whether a pair had been designated correct or in-
correct. Part of the time the subject's decision could be based on 
knowledge of information about either attribute, i.e., the correct pair 
also occurred more often than the incorrect pair. The rest of the 
time specific attribute information was required to make a correct 
jiP 
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decision. He found that subjects could, indeed, keep t11e two attributes 
separated in memory and make decisions concerning one attribute that 
were unaffected by the status of the other attribute. 
Cues may function independently if the response universe, i.e., all 
of the possible responses given the constraints of the cues in terms 
of semantic and/or sensory characteristics, is the same for each cue. 
This is not to say that the likelihood that a particular response will 
be given or that the manner of accessing this set of responses is the 
same. Rather, the set of allowable responses defined by each of the 
cues is the same. In the case of certain attributes this has already 
been shown to be true. 
Bahrick (1974) using a cuing paradigm looked at pictorial and 
position cues either separately or in combination. He presented a page 
of pictures and names in a "seating chart" format. After a free recall 
trial he gave the subject as a cue either the position on the page of 
one of the pictures, the picture itself, or the picture in the position 
in which it occurred on the page. Bahrick found that pictorial and 
position iL1forrnation were encoded independently. That is, it should 
be noted that in this experiment neither cue narrowed down the possible 
responses more than the other or both cues together, i.e., the response 
universe (those names involved in the experiment) is the same for both 
cues separately and together. While more definitive evidence regarding 
independence of cues should be based on comparisons of "joint and 
successive presentation" of cues as Bahrick asserts, it is at the same 
time necessary to consider the redundancy of information about the 
response universe provided by the cues. 
There are instances in the cuing literature where combinations of 
p 
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cues are given which provide additional information about how the re-
sponse universe is to be reduced. One of these is the McLeod et al. 
(1971) study discussed earlier. Both cues were associative but be-
cause they were not associated to each other, it may be assumed that 
they tapped slightly different semantic interpretations of the target. 
Therefore, each additional cue provided information about which ele-
ments of the response universe, given the previous cue, were no longer 
appropriate. 
Solso and Biersdorff (1975) looked at recall with first letter, 
rhyme, and association cues. These three types of cues were used 
because of the lack of redundancy of information about the response 
universe provided by the cues, i.e., no information about the sound of 
the target or its initial letter was given in the association cue and 
vice versa. They presented a list of words followed by a free recall 
trial. Then either the first letter, a rhyme, or an associate of each 
of the unrecalled words was given. Combinations of the first cue and 
an additional cue were then given for the still unrecalled words and 
finally all three cues were presented. They found that the multiple 
cuing situations increased recall far beyond what would be expected if 
the cues acted independently. This result extended also to a set of 
control groups who did not see the list but were to deduce the target 
words from the cues alone. This would seem to imply that the action of 
the cues is predominantly in the generation phase. Solso and Biers-
dorff concluded that the multiple cuing restricts the number of implic-
it associative responses generated and enhances the probability that 
any particular generated response will be given. Furthermore, the 
efficacy of cues is inversely related to the number of associations it 
elicits and directly related to the probability of the target word in 
relation to the cue. 
The Present Experiment 
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The present study provides an additional instance in which each 
added cue provides information about the changing state of the universe 
of acceptable responses, that is, each new cue puts additional con-
straints on the responses that may be given. A preliminary study was 
done to generate the rhyme cues to be used in the experiment. Based 
on strong normative associations, a number of rhymes both orthograph-
ically distinct from and orthographically similar to the possible tar-
gets were generated by the experimenter. A large sample of these 
rhymes was presented to a group of subjects with instructions to gen-
erate as many rhymes as possible in the 30 sec. allotted to each word. 
For the experiment only the first response to each word was tabulated. 
The rhyme cues for the experiment were then selected from those items 
for which the probability of generating the target as a rhyme was 
approximately equal to the probability of generating the target as an 
associate to the association cue. 
Each subject in the experimental conditions was shown a target list 
of common words constructed using the results of the preliminary study. 
This was followed by a brief distractor task and a free recall trial. 
Each subject was cued for all of the target words whether previously 
retrieved or not. One group of subjects received rhyme cues while the 
other group received association cues. These rhyme cues and association 
cues had been previously equated with respect to probability of assoc-
iation to the target stimulus. Then those subjects previously receiv-
ing the rhyme cues were given the association cues, and vice versa. At 
,, 
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this point subjects were uninformed as to which rhyme cue and which 
association cue were associated with the same word. Theoretically, 
these cues should act independently of one another. Finally, all sub-
jects received both the rhyme and association cues together. 
Two groups of control subjects saw and free recalled a list of 
words unrelated to the target list but equated to it in terms of word 
frequency. This was done to maintain procedural equivalence with the 
experimental groups. One group of control subjects was then required 
to generate a rhyming word for each rhyme cue given to the experimental 
groups while the other control group generated a verbal association 
to each association cue given to the experimental groups. Then those 
control subjects previously generating a rhyme response were required 
to generate a verbal association for each association cue and con-
versely those control subjects previously generating a response to the 
association cue were required to generate a rhyming word for each 
rhyme cue. Finally, both control groups generated a response to each 
of the combined rhyme and association cues seen by the experimental 
gruups. This provided a guessing rate for the cues. A number of 
hypotheses were testable with this procedure. 
The Hypotheses 
Nelson and Brooks (1974) had used previously equated rhyme and 
synonym cues and found no difference in their cuing efficacy. They 
concluded that "cueing with either semantic or sensory attributes can 
provide equally effective access to the coded representations of target 
words primed in the context of a rapidly presented list of unrelated 
items." However, each cue was used as both a strong and weak cue for 
different words. This necessitated the construction of several target 
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lists. On the other hand, other cuing studies (e.g., Bregman, 1968; 
Solso & Biersdorff, 1975) did not equate strength of association a 
priori but used a single target list and found definite order of cue 
efficacy effects. This experiment combined pre-equating of cues on 
strength of association and use of a single target list. It was ex-
pected that Nelson and Brooks (1974) would be supported in that there 
would be no difference in the effectiveness of the rhyme and association 
cues. This would imply that sensory and semantic attributes can be 
equally effective when encoding is not influenced by directing atten-
tion to specific characteristics of the items. 
Biersdorff and Solso (in preparation) presented two recall cues 
for each target either at the same time or at different points in the 
cuing protocol. They found that there was little or no interaction 
when the cues were presented separately. However, because subjects 
were given no more cues once the target was retrieved, no rigorous 
measurement of the cues' independence in this type of task was possible. 
The present experiment was able to make more specific predictions about 
the effect of a first cue on the effectiveness of a second cue because 
it did not rely on the tacit assumption that once a target is retrieved 
by one cue, another cue will also produce the target solely due to the 
target having been previously retrieved. Rather, this study provided 
a direct test of that assumption. If recall for the cue when it is 
presented second is greater than when it is presented first, then it 
might be concluded that once a target is retrieved there are two memory 
representations, one corresponding to the item as retrieved and one 
corresponding to the item in the list representation, either of which 
may be retrieved in cued recall. While this issue of multiple repre-
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sentation is important to the study of retrieval processes in general, 
the mathematical models presented here take into account retrieval of 
either representation of the target and do not discriminate which of 
the representations is being retrieved. If, however, there is indepen-
dent encoding of attributes as seems to be the case with semantic in-
terpretations within the associative verbal attribute, then it would be 
expected that recall for the cue when presented first would be about 
the same as when presented second. It was hypothesized in the present 
study that independence of separately presented cues would in general 
be supported and that there would be little or no difference in recall 
between the cues when presented first and the same cues when presented 
second. 
It has been suggested by Bregman (1968) that sensory and semantic 
cues are differentially effective based on the amount of time (or 
number of items) intervening between presentation of an item and cued 
recall of that item. It is possible that the reason that graphic cues 
are more effective at short intervals and semantic cues are more 
effective at long intervals is that the task being performed in the 
interval calls for organization of the material to be remembered on some 
meaningful and efficient dimension. At short intervals or with few in-
tervening items a sensory-based code would be most efficient because 
extensive recoding of the target is not necessary. But as the amount 
of information to be remembered exceeds some limit, usually considered 
to be seven plus or minus two items, some higher order organization or 
chunking is necessary. A semantic recoding of infonuation is more 
efficient in this instance. It would seem possible then that in Berg-
man's task items were initially coded in terms of their sensory features 
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and as the need to retain these items for longer periods of time be-
came evident they were recoded into some semantic structure. Therefore, 
cuing the item after a few items intervened would be more successful 
with a sensory based cue while cuing the item after a great number of 
items intervened would be more successful with a semantic cue. 
In the present experiment there are fewer list items to intervene 
between presentation of any particular item and recall of that item. 
Also, the task which intervenes between the last list item presented 
and the free recall trial is non-verbal and should provide little assoc-
iative interference. If the tasks should cause the sensory coding of 
the list to be interfered with more than the semantic coding, the rhyme 
cue would be less effective than the associative cue on the first cued 
recall trial and even less effective on the second cued recall trial 
since an associative cued recall task immediately preceded it. However, 
the present experiment is similar in terms of order and type of task to 
the Nelson and Brooks (1974) experiment, at least up to the second cued 
recall trial in which differential interference was not found. There-
fore, it was predicted here that cued recall with a sensory based cue 
would not be interfered with more than cued recall with a semantic based 
cue and that there would be no difference in number of items recalled 
with rhyme or association on either the first or on the second cued 
recall trial. 
Biersdorf f and Solso (in preparation) also found that recall for 
those subjects who were shown the two cues together far exceeded recall 
for the two cues separately. But it was assumed that once the target 
was retrieved with one cue, it would be retrieved with that cue and an 
additional cue, an assumption somewhat more acceptable than that re-
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trieval using one cue guaranteed retrieval using a different cue. It 
seems more likely that, since the same cue is presented in the two cue 
combination as was presented earlier alone, if the cue was effective 
alone, it should be effective in the combination. Continuing to cue 
targets that have already been retrieved was hypothesized to control 
for the possibility that the cue in combination with another cue might 
change the context enough so that the originally successful cue might 
not be effective. Furthermore, it was predicted that the suggestion 
of McLeod et al. (1971) that two cues insufficient to produce a re-
sponse when presented separately might do so when presented together 
would be supported by these data. It was suggested that the mechanism 
responsible for this effect had its locus in the generation phase rather 
than the recognition phase or both phases together. As such, this 
effect would be found in the control groups which generated responses 
in, presumably, the same manner as the experimental groups but was not 
charged with a recognition task. Following a generation-recognition 
approach to cued recall, one would expect that both experimental and 
control groups when given two cues separately would generate a full set 
of responses for each cue while when given the two cues together would 
generate for serious consideration only those responses that fit the 
specifications of both cues. As such, there would be fewer responses 
to choose from when the two cues were presented together than when they 
were presented at separate times. The decision concerning which of the 
generated responses to give is based on chance in the control groups and 
chance plus recognition in the experimental groups. Chance, however, 
is a function of the number of items the response is to be chosen from 
and, therefore, is actually a function of the response generation phase. 
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This "chance" is a part of the experimental groups' response processes 
and is commonly referred to as guessing. It was therefore predicted 
that the effect of two cues together being more effective than the same 
two cues presented at separate times would be present in both the ex-
perimental and the control groups and that the effect was due to changes 
in the guessing rate, not cuing per se. Furthermore, because responding 
in the experimental groups was based on recognition in addition to 
chance, cued recall would exceed simple guessing of the target. 
Finally, McLeod et al. (1971) presented several mathematical models 
in an attempt to predict response behavior in cuing situations. The 
predictions of these models, presented below, were compared for each 
level of cuing in this study to a mathematical model generated to fit 
Solso and Biersdorff's (1975) assertion that multiple cuing restricts 
the number of responses generated and enhances their probability of 
association. 
Additive Model 
The most widely used and simplest model for prediction of cued 
recall results has been the additive model which proposes that "there 
is no positive interaction between two cues in aiding retrieval" (McLeod 
et al., 1971, p. 62). The probability that a first cue was successful 
in eliciting the target response in no way influences the probability 
that a second cue will elicit the target response. In the present ex-
periment this model would predict that on the first cued recall trial 
the probability of success would be the probability that the target had 
been free recalled on the preceding trial plus the probability that the 
target could be guessed given the cue, i.e. , the a priori probability of 
association between the cue and target, minus the product of the pre-
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ceding two probabilities. Mathematically, this would be stated as 
where CR1 cued recall success with the first cue, 
FR successful retrieval of the target on the free 
recall trial, and 
Ci the ~ priori association between the cue and the 
target as measured with normative data or guess-
ing rate. 
As there is no interaction between the cues and since, in this ex-
periment, both cues were approximately equiprobable, the probability 
of retrieving any target on the second cued recall trial would be a 
function, once again, of the probability that the target had been free 
recalled and the ~ priori probability of association between the cue 
and target. That is, 
P(CR2)=P(FR)+P(Ci)-P(FR)P(Ci) 
Or P(CR2)=P(CR1). 
On the final cued recall trial in which both cues are prP-~ented 
together, the additive model predicts that the probability of success-
ful recall would be the probability of recall on the first cued recall 
trial, which includes the probability of free recalling the target, plus 
the ~ priori probability of association between the second cue and the 
target minus the product of these two probabilities, since they are 
independent. Mathematically, this becomes 
P(CR1+2)=P(CR1)+P(Ci)-P(CR1)P(Ci) 
Or P(CR1+2)=P(FR)+2P(Ci)-2P(FR)P(Ci)-[YCci)] 2+P(FR)[PCCi~ 2 . 
Strength Model 
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The strength model, also presented by McLeod~ ~1· (1971), 
"supposes that each possible response has a number attached to it, which 
is increased by the presentation of one cue, and by that of a second 
one" (p. 63). Each previous presentation of a cue increases the like-
lihood that the target response is given. On the free recall trial, 
successful retrieval is determined by the strength of the target response, 
as represented by a hypothetical "number", divided by the strength of 
the target and all other responses combined. This can be expressed 
mathematically as 
P(FR)= R 
R+T 
where R the strength of the target response on the free 
recall trial, and 
T = the strength of all other responses combined. 
Based on this equation, a further statement can be derived which will 
be, in the long run, computationally simpler. 
And 
1-P (FR)=l-_!_ 
R+T 
R+T 
T 
P(FR) 
1-P (FR) 
= R R+T 
--x--R+T T 
R 
T 
On the first cued recall trial some constant amount of strength is 
multiplied with the free recall target strength. Assuming that the tar-
get is in the response set of the first cue, the probability of success-
ful retrieval becomes 
P(CR1)=C·P(FR) 
where C a cuing constant by which the original strength 
is multiplied to get the new strength for any cue. 
Further, 
P(CR1) C·~ 
l-P(CR1) T 
C· P(FR) 
1-P(FR) 
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On the second cued recall trial, the strength obtained on the first 
cued recall trial is multiplied by this same constant such that 
P(CR2)=C·P(CR1) 
And P (CR2) c2.R 
l-P(CR2) T 
c.CR 
T 
c· 
P(CR1) 
l-P(CR1) 
= 
P(CR1) • c. 
l-P(CR1) 
= 
r P(CR1 ) J 
L 1-P (CR1) 
R 
T 
-[ P(CR1 ) 
l-P(CR1) r 
R 
T 
R 
T 
T 
R 
1-P(FR) l 
P(FR) ·1 
Converting this statement back in terms of the probability of cued re-
call success using the second retrieval cue, the strength model predicts 
that 
1-P(FR) l 
!_ P(FR) J 
.1-l-P(FR)l1 l P(FR) .J) 
On the final cued recall trial, the strength on the preceding trial is 
once again multiplied by the cuing constant such that 
And P(CR1+2) 
l-P(CR1+2 ) 
= c3 . g 
T 
= c·c2.R 
T 
P(CR2 ) c· 
= c· 
l-P(CR2) 
R 
T 
R 
T 
[ 
P(CR1) -, 1- P(CR1 ) l 
= l-P(cR1)] .Ll-P(CR1 ) _ 
I- P(FR) J [ P(FR) J L 1-P(FR) J L 1-P(FR) 
rP(CRl) 13 
= Q--P(CR1)J 
[ 
P(FR) ]2 
1-P(FR) 
2 
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Converting this statement back in terms of the probability of cued recall 
success using both retrieval cues, the strength model predicts that 
[ 
P ( CR1 ) 1
1
, 
3 
,-_l -_P_(_FR_)_-,l 2 
1-P (CR1) · j P(FR) _ P(CR1+2)= -
1+1·1- P(CR1)J 3. r 1-P(FR) ll 2J/ 
_l-P(CR1) L P(FR) -
Power Model 
The power model is based on the notion that the response probability 
for each cue is solely dependent on the number of possible responses 
left. Each succeeding cue works to eliminate some proportion of the re-
sponse universe. An additional assumption is made that each cue elim-
inates the same proportion of possible responses. On the free recall 
trial, the probability of successful retrieval for any one target is 
represented mathematically as 
P(FR)= _! 
s 
where S = the original number of responses in the universe. 
On the first cued recall trial, and on subsequent recall trials, 
the response universe is reduced by some constant proportion. In other 
words, the cue delimits the responses that are still possible. Math-
ematically, this can be represented as 
c.l 
s 
= C·P(FR) 
where C = the amount by which the cue divides the number of 
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possible responses. 
On the second cued recall trial, the response universe is again re-
duced by the same proportion. Thus 
C.P(FR) • P(CR ) 
P(FR) 1 
~(CRl)] 2 
P(FR) 
On the last cued recall trial the response universe is again re-
duced by the same proportion. Thus 
= C·P (CR ) 2 
=C·P(FR) 
P(FR) 
Aggregate Model 
[P(CR1~ 3 
[P(FR) J 2 
This model combines features of each of the models presented above. 
Because the cues are first presented separately, independence of the 
cues is assumed for these trials. But when the two cues are presented 
together, the number of possible responses left in the response universe 
is reduced, as suggested by the power model and the strength of assoc-
iation between the cue and the target response increases as suggested 
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by the strength model. This change as a whole follows the basic laws 
of conditional probability. As the response universe is reduced, the 
associated probabilities of the remaining responses assume a new denom-
inator. For instance, if the target has a probability of response to 
both cue A and cue B of .40 and only one other word is associated with 
both cues but with a probability of .01, then when the two cues are 
presented together the probability of responding with the target 
or .976 and the probability of responding with the non-target is 
is .40 
.41 
.01 
.41 
or .024. The response universe has been reduced to two words with a 
combined probability of .41. As can be seen, this reduction of the re-
sponse universe is of the order 
P(CR)= R 
R+T 
where R 
T 
the probability of giving the target response, and 
the combined probability of giving all other 
responses. 
Clearly, this is the basic prediction of the strength model. While 
increasing the probability of association on each trial by a multiplier, 
this model actually is dividing the denominator, which is the response 
universe. It is a slightly more conservative form of the power model, 
which has been shown by McLeod !':! al. (1971) to overpredict response 
probabilities. 
The aggregate model states that on the first two cued recall trials, 
in which the subject does not know which items of the two cue sets are 
for the same target, the additive model holds. On the trial in which 
the two cues are combined, the aggregate model proposes that there is a 
reduction of the response universe due to the constraints imposed by 
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the first cue, the second cue, and the unique combination of the two 
cues. This prediction is most consistent with the strength model which 
is proposed to explain the data from the third cued recall trial. 
Comparison of the Models 
It is possible to distinguish the models on the basis of the pre-
dictions that each makes concerning the outcomes of the second and third 
cued recall trials. Because of the use of the free recall score and the 
first cued recall score as parameters in the power and strength models, 
it is impossible to derive independent predictions for these models on 
the free recall and first cued recall trials. However, because of the 
nature of the models it can be safely predicted that the strength that 
is added and the number of responses by which the universe is reduced 
give the same probability of response as the additive and aggregate 
models. A graphic representation of the predictions of each model for 
each trial in the experiment is presented in Figure 1. 
Assuming that the free recall score is some arbitrary x where x is 
a value between 0 and 1, the additive model predicts that the first 
cued recall score in which the ~ priori probability of association be-
tween cue and target is .20 would be x + .20 - .2x or .Bx+ .2. As 
stated above, at this level all of the models make the same prediction. 
At the second level of cued recall the predictions of the models differ. 
While the additive and aggregate models predict that the cues are in-
dependent and that the response probability is the same as on the first 
cued recall trial, the strength model predicts that the response pro-
bability would be [ J 2 [ l • Bx+. 2 . 1-x 1-(.Bx+.2) x , and the power model 
1 +! r. Bx+. 2 l 2 . [__!:_x:] t 
l_ 1- (. Bx+. 2 ~ x j 
-Ostrength 
VPower 
6,Aggregate 
.8 0Additive 
.7 . 
. 6 
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Figure 1. A comparison of the models in terms of their 
predictions on each trial (using .5 as the probability that 
an item is free recalled.) 
--
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predicts that the response probability would be (.8x+.2) or .64x + .32 
x 
+ .o4 . On the third cued recall trial in which both cues are presented 
x 
together the additive model predicts that the response probability would 
be .8x+.2+.2-.2(.8x+.2) or .64x+.36; the strength and aggregate models 
predict a response probability of 
[ .8x+.2 13 .[(1-x)J 2 i - c . ax+. 2 > ~I x 
{ l-(.8x+.2)j x j l )f . Bx+. 2 ] 3 • r (l-x)_l2J 
and the power model predicts a probability of response of 
(.8x+.2)3 
x2 
or .512x+.384+ .096 + .008 . It was predicted that the 
x 
aggregate model would be more accurate at all stages of the experiment 
on which the models can be distinguished because this model takes into 
account the nature of the interaction of the cues at each level. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Preliminary Study 
Subjects. One hundred fifty introductory psychology students ful-
filling a course requirement served as subjects and gave responses for 
all list items. 
Materials. Fifty target words were selected from the Palermo and 
Jenkins (1964) word association norms with the constraint that each 
target had a stimulus that elicited it with a probability between .15 
and .25. The experimenter generated up to four common words that 
rhymed with the targets. No more than two of the four rhymes were or-
thographically similar to the target response. Since some of the tar-
gets had fewer than two rhymes that were either orthographically similar 
to or distinct from the target responses, the final list consisted of 
151 stimulus words. 
Each word was typed in capital letters on a standard 8~ x 11 page 
and was followed by two lines on which the subject was to record the 
rhyme responses. There were approximately 18 words per page and at 
least ten words were used with approximately the same number of subjects 
receiving each order. 
Procedure. Subjects were given 30 sec. to write down as many words 
that rhymed with each stimulus as they could in the order that they 
thought of them. At the end of the 30 sec. a tone sounded and subjects 
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were to move on to the next word. Subjects were instructed not to work 
ahead or to return to past words. While only first responses were tab-
ulated, generation of multiple rhyme responses allowed the experimenter 
to measure the size of the response universe both in terms of the total 
number of words generated and in the number of first responses gener-
ated. 
Main Experiment 
Subjects. Eighty introductory psychology students fulfilling a 
course requirement served as subjects. Of these, 20 subjects were ran-
domly assigned to each of the two experimental groups and the two con-
trol groups. 
Materials. The target list was composed of 15 words with a fre-
quency between 17 and 750 per million in the Kucera and Francis (1967) 
frequency count. None of the list words rhymed and there was little or 
no association among the words. The association cue for each target was 
taken from the Palermo and Jenkins (1964) word association norms as re-
coded by Biersdorff and Solso (1973) with a mean association probability 
of .196 and a standard deviation of .03. In addition, all targets were 
either the most popular or second most popular response for the assoc-
iation cues. The rhyme cues were selected from the stimuli presented 
in the preliminary study such that the average response probability for 
the target given the rhyme cue was .197 with a standard deviation of 
.032. All targets were either the first, second, or third most popular 
response to the rhyme cue. In addition, approximately half of the 
rhymes were orthographically similar (67% mean letter overlap) to the 
targets while the other half were orthographically distinct (44% mean 
letter overlap) from the targets. ! priori probabilities for the com-
bined cues were derived directly from the control group subjects who 
were to give responses to the cues in a free association type of task. 
The list of target words, rhyme and association cues, and their proba-
bilities of association to the targets are included in Table 1. Five 
different orders of the target list were created so that each word 
appeared an equal number of times in each fifth of the list. 
The equivalent list for the control groups consisted of 15 words 
chosen from the same level of the Kucera and Francis (1967) word count 
as the target list. In addition, none of the words rhymed with or was 
associated with any of the words in the target list as measured by 
Palermo and Jenkins (1964). These are also presented in Table 1. 
Procedure. In the two experimental groups the target list was 
presented serially at a 2-sec. rate via a Lafayette memory drum. Five 
different list orders were used to control for primacy effects across 
subjects. Following presentation of the list, a 1-min. math computa-
tion task was given to control for recency. Subjects were thsn given 
one minute to write down as many list words as they could remember on 
36 
a sheet of paper marked with 15 spaces, one per word. A single cue was 
then given for each of the target words regardless of whether the word 
had or had not been recalled. One experimental group received the 
rhyme cues and the other group the associative cues. Several orders of 
each set of cues were used with an equal number of subjects receiving 
each order in each group. Further, each cue appeared in each third of 
the list an equal number of times. Each cue was typed in capital letters 
on a 3 X 5 index card with its relation to the target in lower case 
directly below it. Each cue was presented for up to 15 sec. and the 
--
TABLE 1 
Targets, Their Rhymes and Association Cues with Accompanying 
Probabilities of Association, and the Equivalent Control List 
TARGETS 
Bed 
Heat 
Arm 
Girl 
Talk 
Nurse 
Home 
Church 
Song 
Hill 
Fast 
Us 
Here 
Soft 
Lose 
RHYMES 
Said (.19) 
Sheet (.17) 
Farm (. 25) 
Whirl (.19) 
Hawk (. 21) 
Worse ( .15) 
Foam ( .19) 
Birch ( .17) 
Wrong (.25) 
Bill (. 22) 
Passed (.15) 
Bus (.17) 
Mere (.23) 
Coughed (.21) 
Whose (.21) 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Sleep (.21) 
Stove ( .17) 
Hand ( .15) 
Beautiful (.16) 
Speak (. 25) 
Doctor ( .17) 
House (.23) 
Religion (. 21) 
Music (.16) 
Mountain (. 21) 
Running (. 24) 
We (.19) 
Where (.19) 
Carpet (.21) 
Find (.19) 
CONTROL LIST 
Post 
Train 
Jump 
Heart 
Born 
Add 
Day 
Pan 
Rose 
Saw 
Short 
Terms 
Growth 
Nor 
Came 
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subject was required to make a response within this time, guessing if 
necessary. Responses were recorded on a sheet of paper with 15 spaces 
by each subject. No feedback was given as to whethPr a response was 
correct or incorrect. 
Following presentation of the 15 cues, those subjects initially 
receiving the rhyme cues were given the associative cues for each tar-
get and those subjects initially receiving the associative cues were 
given the rhyme cues for each target word. The same general procedure 
was followed as with the first set of cues. 
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Finally, the subjects in each of the two experimental groups were 
shown both the rhyme and associative cues for each target word. Again, 
several orders of the cues were used across subjects. The two cues for 
each target were typed in capital letters side by side on a single in-
dex card with their relations to the target, i.e., association or rhyme, 
typed in lower case directly below. Rhymes and associative cues appeared 
in the left position an equal number of times. The same general proce-
dure was followed as on the preceding two trials. 
The two control groups served to measure the probability that sub-
jects might generate the target response even if they had not seen the 
target list. Each of these subjects was shown the equivalent non-target 
list described above serially at a 2-sec. rate via a Lafayette memory 
drum. The same 1-min. math computation task that the experimental 
groups performed was then given. Following this, subjects wrote down 
as many of the words from the list as they could remember in 1 min. 
These free recall scores were compared to the free recall scores of the 
subjects in the experimental groups to assure that there were no initial 
differences in short term memory capacity between the experimental and 
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control subjects. The two control groups were shown the same orders of 
cues and were required to give a word that rhymed with or was associated 
with the word on the index card, depending on the relationship shown on 
that card. The subjects were instructed that the list they had just 
seen was in no way connected with the words they were to generate. The 
control subjects were allowed 15 sec. to generate a response to each 
cue. If the subject had not responded in this amount of time, he was 
instructed to give a response quickly. Within these constraints, the 
control subjects, like the experimental subjects, generated responses 
first to one set of cues, then to the other set of cues, and finally to 
the two sets of cues together. A schematic of the design and procedure 
is presented in Table 2. 
--
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TABLE 2 
Schematic of the Design and Procedure 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS CONTROL GROUPS 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
---
LIST Target Target Equivalent Equivalent 
PRESENTED 
( One Minute Mathematical Computation Task ) 
FREE Target Target Equivalent Equivalent 
RECALL List List List List 
FIRST 
CUE Rhyme Association Rhyme Association 
SECOND 
CUE Association Rhyme Association Rhyme 
THIRD Rhyme + Rhyme + Rhyme + Rhyme + 
CUE Association Association Association Association 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
As expected, the order of presentation of the cues (i.e., rhyme 
on the first cued recall trial and associative cue on the second cued 
recall trial or associative cue on the first cued recall trial and rhyme 
on the second cued recall trial) did not affect recall on either of the 
first cued recall trials. The experimental subjects recalled signifi-
cantly more words (p <.01) than the control subjects. Mean recall 
scores for each group are presented in Table 3. This result may indi-
cate that, while the control subjects were merely guessing some of the 
target responses, experimental subjects were able to rely on the pre-
sence of the target list in memory as well as the cues in generating 
their responses. Experimental subjects were doing more than deducing 
the correct response given the cues. The effects of cue order and 
previous experience with the target list on recall performance on the 
first and second cued recall trials were measured by a 2 X 2 X 2 nested 
ANOVA with repeated measures across the cues. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 4. This analysis indicated that the two 
cues presented separately are not independent. It had been hypothesized 
that if a word was initially recalled on the first cued recall trial, 
then it was no more likely to~recalled on the second cued recall tri~l 
with a different cue than if it had been unrecalled on the immediately 
preceding cued recall trial. As 1an be seen in Table 3, there was sig-
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Number of Target Words 
Trial 
Free 
Recall 
1st cued 
Recalled on Each Recall Trial by Each Group 
Experimental 
X of AR & 
RA Order AR Order RA Orders 
7.5(2.12) 7.0(1.94) 7.25(2.0) 
Control 
RA Order AR Order 
----* ----* 
X of AR & 
RA Orders 
----* 
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Recall 8.6(2.17) 8.5(1.58) 8.55(1.84) 2.7(1.42) 3.4(1.43) 3.05(1.43) 
2nd cued 
Recall 9.7(2.54) 9.7(2.58) 9.7(2.49) 4.8(2.49) 4.3(2.21) 4.55(2.31) 
3rd cued 
Recall 11.9(3.28) 13.9(.99) 12.9(2.57) 10.4(2.95) 11.2(3.91) 10.8(3.40) 
* Number of items recalled on the equivalent to target list. 
/ 
·.,. ~. II 
" 
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TABLE 4 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for First Two Cued Recall Trials 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Subjects 767.3875 9 
Order .0125 1 .0125 <l 
Exper. /Contrl. 567 .1125 1 567 .1125 17.0006* 
Order X E/C .1125 1 .1125 <l 
S(Order X E/C) 200.15 6 33.358 
Within Subject 158.5 70 
1st or 2nd cue 35.1125 1 35.1125 19. 45*,-c 
1 or 2 x Order 1.5125 1 1.5125 <l 
1 or 2 x E/C .6125 1 .6125 <l 
1 or 2 x Order 
X E/C 2.113 1 2.113 1.17 
1 or 2 X 
S (Order x E/C) 119.1495 66 1.8053 
Total 925.8875 79 
* p <.01 
** p <.001 
nificantly better recall on the second cued recall trial than on the 
first cued recall trial (p <.001). A simple effects analysis measured 
whether this increase in recall between the first and second cued trials 
was present in both the experimental and control group protocols. The 
increase in recall across the first and second cued recall trials was 
significant for both the experimental subjects (p <.01) and the control 
subjects (p <.001) as seen in Table 4. A summary table of this simple 
effects analysis is presented in Table 5. This seems to indicate that 
once a person gives a particular response to a cue, that response is 
more likely to be given again when a cue is provided that generates 
that word as one of its associates or rhymes. 
It was hypothesized earlier that cued recall with the rhyme cue 
would not be interfered with more than cued recall with the associative 
cue when preceded by a recall trial using the other cue type. A simple 
effects analysis measured the extent to which recall for a cue presented 
second exceeded recall for the same cue type when presented first. As 
can be seen in Table 3, there is a significant increase (p <.05) in 
recall across the first two cued recall trials for the rhyme cue and 
a marginally significant increase in recall (p <.052) across the first 
two cued recall trials for the association cue. The increase is approx-
imately the same for both the rhyme and the association 
for the rhyme cue and F=3.81 for the associative cue). 
this analysis is also presented in Table 5. 
cues (F=4.11 
Thelsummary of 
I 
! 
The probability that a word recalled or not recalled j,n a previous 
trial was recalled on a later trial is also measured using conditional 
probabilities. As can be seen in Table 6, the probability that a word 
recalled on the free recall trial is retained on the first cued recall 
Simple Effects in the 
Source 
1st or 2nd Cue 
1 or 2 at 
Experimental 
1 or 2 at 
Control 
1 or 2 X 
S(Order X E/C) 
1 or 2 at 
Rhyme 
1 or 2 at 
Association 
S(Order X E/C) + 
1 or 2 X S(Order 
X E/C) 
* p <.05 
** p <.01 
*** p <.001 
SS 
35 .1125 
13.225 
22.5 
119.1496 
18.225 
16.9 
319.2995 
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TABLE 5 
1st or 2nd Cued Recall Variable 
df MS F 
1 35.1125 19. 4497~'•** 
1 13. 225 7.326** 
1 22.5 12.463*** 
66 2.113 
1 18.225 4.1096* 
1 16.9 3.8109 
72 4.!~347 
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TABLE 6 
Mean Conditional Probabilities of Recall 
Experimental Control 
RA Order AR Order RA Order AR Order 
(CR1 I FR) .353 .347 
* * 
(CR1 jFR) .220 .207 * * 
(CR1 jFR) .140 .120 * * 
(CR1 !FR) .287 .327 * * 
(CR2 jcR1) .440 .380 .073 .080 
(CR2 !cR1) .187 .267 .247 .207 
(CR2 jcR1) .133 .173 .107 .147 
(CR2 !cR1) .240 .180 .573 .567 
(CR2 jcR1 U FR) .527 .447 .073 .080 
(CR2 j CR1 U FR) .100 .200 .247; .207 
(CR2 jcR1 U FR) .193 .207 .10? .147 
./3 (CR2 jcR1 U FR) .180 .147 .567 
(CR3 !cR2 U CR1 U FR) .707 .813 .377 .360 
(CR3 jcR2 U CR1 U FR) .073 .073 .307 .377 
(CR3 jcR2 u CR1 U FR) .133 .060 .067 .073 
(CR3 !cR2 u CR1 U FR) .107 .053 .260 .180 
* These probabilities are not reported as the free recall was made with 
a different list. 
trial is approximately .35 regardless of whether that cue was a rhyme 
or an association cue. The probability that a word unrecalled on the 
free recall trial is recalled with a single cue is also approximately 
the same with the rhyme and the association cue. It is apparent from 
this table as well as the previous analyses that as the cued recall 
trials progress, recall performance is relatively stable in that both 
cues are about equally effective in cuing the targets regardless of 
whether the targets had or had not been retrieved on previous trials. 
This correspondence of conditional probabilities across the two cue 
orders is found for both the experimental and control sbbjects. 
A 2 X 2 ANOVA measured the effect of having seen~he target list 
and previous cue presentation order on recall on the final cued recall 
trial. A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 7. On this 
last cued recall trial the experimental subjects recalled a signifi-
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cantly greater number of target items than the control subjects (p <.05) 
and order of cue presentation on the previous cued recall trials (rhyme 
then associative cue or associative cue then rhyme) had no effect either 
alone or in interaction with the Experimental vs. Control variable. 
As the number of cued recall trials increased, the recall scores 
of the experimental and control subjects became increasingly closer to 
each other. This effect can be seen in Figure 2 in which the mean pro-
bability of recall is presented for both cue orders of the experimental 
and control groups for each recall trial. It appears to be the case 
that as the recall performance of the experimental groups gets closer 
to unity the distance between the recall scores of the control subjects 
and experimental subjects becomes smaller. This effect may be due to 
the fact that the experimental subjects approached asymptote earlier in 
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TABLE 7 
Summary of Analysis of Variance on the Final Cued Recall Trial 
Source SS df MS F 
Exper. /Contrl. 44.1 1 44.1 4.93* 
Order 19.6 1 19.6 2.19 
E/C X Order 3.6 1 3.6 <l 
S(E/C X Order) 321.8 36 8.938 
Total 389.1 39 
* p <.05 
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Figure 2. Mean probability of recall for the experimental 
and control groups on each recall trial. 
so 
recall performance than did the control subjects. 
This earlier asymptotic performance of the experimental subjects may 
account for the results of two correlated t-tests of the hypothesis that 
the two simultaneous cues would produce better recall than the two cues 
separately presented. The measure of cumulative recall for the separate 
presentations was the total of the target items recalled on the free re-
call and the two cued recall trials. Within the control groups recall 
performance on the final cued recall trial was 10.8 words out of 15 
possible while on the preceding trials combined 6.5 of the 15 possible 
words were recalled. The t-test performed on the control groups con-
firmed the hypothesis that the two cues together produced better recall 
than the two cues separately (t=4.92, df = 19, p <.001). However, with-
in the experimental groups recall performance on the final cued recall 
trial was 12.9 out of 15 possible targets while on the preceding trials 
combined, 12.85 of the 15 possible targets were recalled. In the ex-
perimental groups recall performance with the two cues together was not 
significantly different from rec2ll with tte two cues separately (t= 
.1365, df = 19, p >.10). Several explanations for this finding are 
possible. It may be the case that recall performance on the free re-
call and first two cued recall trials is sufficiently high such that in 
order for performance on the final cued recall trial to be significant-
ly better than the previous trials combined, last trial performance 
would have to be near perfect. (Last trial performance would have to 
be 13.61 out of 15 possible target words to be significantly better 
than the combined previous trials at the .05 level.) An alternative 
explanation for the difference in results of the t-tests is that the 
processes involved in cued recall are different from and do not overlap 
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with the processes involved in deduction of the targets. This alter-
native seems less likely when the parallelism of the control group and 
experimental group recall curves is considered (see Figure 2). 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests were performed individ-
ually comparing the predictions of each of the models with the data on 
both the second and third cued recall trials. The predictions of the 
models were determined by substituting the actual free recall score 
and the first cued recall score (or, in the case of the additive model, 
the ~ priori probability of association between cue and target) for the 
parameters of the model. Thus 20 predicted scores were obtained for 
each model. The means for the data, power, strength, and additive 
models on each trial are represented in Figure 3. The predictions of 
the aggregate model can be determined by connecting the prediction of 
the additive model in the second cued recall trial with the prediction 
of the strength model on the third cued recall trial, 
One adjustment on the power model was made later. Since the power 
model predicted a probability of a correct response of greater than one 
on several occasions, and since better than perfect performance is not 
possible, all predictions of greater than unity were reduced to one. 
The revised predictions of the models are represented in Figure 4. 
Wilcoxon tests were performed on both the original and revised predic-
tions of the power model. 
On the second cued recall trial all of the models predicted the 
data well (p <.05 that the data do not differ from the predictions of 
the models) with the strength model slightly superior on this set of 
tests. However, the slight advantage of this model may be artificial 
since by summing the absolute differences between the prediction of 
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each model and the data it is trying to predict, the additive model is 
a slightly superior predictor than the strength model (mean absolute 
difference on a scale of 0 to 1 of .214 as compared with .226). Also, 
if a count is made of the number of times each model provides the best 
prediction of the three, the additive model once again has a slight ad-
vantage. (The additive model predicts best in nine cases, the strength 
model in seven cases, and the power model in four cases.) 
On the final cued recall trial the Wilcoxon tests showed that the 
data exceeded the predictions of the strength and additive models 
(p <.01 for both). Using both the revised and unrevised predictions 
the power model predicts the data fairly well (p >.05). However, when 
a count is made of the number of times each model provides the best pre-
diction of the three, the strength model predicts twice as well as 
either of the other two models. Furthermore, when the absolute differ-
ences between the predictions of the models and the data are summed 
and the mean absolute differences calculated, the additive model is a 
slightly better predictor than the other models. (The mean absolute 
difference on a scale from 0 to 1 for the additive model is .302, for 
the strength model .303, for the unrevised power model .459, and for 
the revised power model .317.) Clearly no firm statement can be made 
as to which of the models best fits the data. It depends on the cri-
terion used, It appears, however, from looking at Figure 4, that none 
of the models predicts adequately in terms of the shape of the recall 
curve. Much of the difficulty stems from certain of the assumptions 
of the models not being met. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
A number of outcomes both predicted and unpredicted have been ob-
served in this experiment. First, it seems clear from these data that 
cuing, in general, improves the number of target items that are re-
trieved since the recall scores of the experimental groups significantly 
surpass those of. the control groups. This experiment, then~ provides 
some evidence that cuing with a cue not explicitly encoded at input 
can aid in retrieval and that this improvement is not entirely due to 
guessing more targets. 
Another finding of this study is that given equal ~ priori proba-
bilities of association between the two cues and the target thay are 
associated with, both sensory-based and semantic-based cues can be 
equally effective within the context of a fairly short list. This is 
posited to be due to the fact that the shortness of the list d~~ not 
necessitate that an extremely structured organization be applied to the 
list. It is quite possible that if a lengthy list had been used, the 
findings of Bregman (1968) would have been supported and the more highly 
structurable semantic organization would have led to a superiority of 
the association over the rhyme cue as an aid to recall. In the present 
experiment, however, it may be concluded that when no input cue is given 
which may bias the encoding in favor of one particular characteristic 
of the item, both sensory and semantic cues may be equally effective. 
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There also seems to be little or no proactive interference due to 
the nature of the first cue as witnessed by the facts that recall on 
the second cued trial exceeded recall on the first cued trial and that 
there was no order of cue effect on either the second or third cued 
recall trial. The data seemed to indicate that, contrary to the pre-
dictions made earlier, once an item is retrieved it tends to be more 
easily retrievable on later trials even when a different aspect of the 
item is cued. This is to be expected if one holds that more than one 
representation of the item now exists in memory for the successfully 
retrieved word or that the representation of that item in memory is 
somehow made stronger by each retrieval of the item. The implication 
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of this finding, then, is that cues, even when presented separately, are 
not independent. 
One finding of this study which moderates this conclusion is that 
guessing in the control groups followed the same pattern. There is a 
tendency to respond with the same word in situations which allow it. 
Since it was more likely to find a target list item which could fit 
bo~h the rhyme and association cue constraints than a non-target item, 
there was a tendency in the control groups to repeat target items in 
later cued recall trials and to give different, possibly target, re-
sponses when the first response did not meet the constraints of the 
second cue. Therefore, the effect of non-independence of cues in the 
experimental groups could be entirely due to something inherent in the 
guessing strategy. 
McLeod, Williams, and Broadbent (1971) had earlier considered the 
possibility that two cues presented together would aid retrieval more 
than the same two cues presented separately. This study provides 
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evidence both contradictory to and supporting their contention. In 
an analysis of the number of different items recalled cumulatively over 
the first three recall trials as compared with the number of items re-
called on the last recall trial, it was found that the experimental 
subjects did not recall significantly more items with the two cues to-
gether than with the two cues separately. Several explanations are 
possible. The most plausible of these is that the effect was confounded 
by asymptotic performance. Because approximately half of the items 
were free recalled and because each of the cues added somewhat to the 
number of items recalled, by the time the two cues were presented to-
gether, nearly all of the target words had been recalled on at least one 
of the previous trials. It should be noted that when a similar analy-
sis was performed on the control data in which no free recall of the 
target list was possible, recall for the two cues together significant-
ly exceeded the number of different items recalled on the preceding two 
single cue trials. In the case of the control groups, deduction of 
the target words with the two cuP.s separately was not so great as to 
leave little room for improvement in recall when the two cues were 
presented together. If this is indeed what is happening, then the locus 
of the effect of recall for two cues together exceeding cumulative re-
call for the same two cues separately is in the response generation 
phase of retrieval. 
The generation-recognition model of cued recall from memory serves 
as a good basis for differentiating the experimental and control groups 
according to the processes involved in choosing a response. While the 
experimental groups generate a response or a number of responses that 
fit the cues and then recognize one as the target (or guess), the con-
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trol groups do not have a recognition phase. Therefore, anything which 
causes the experimental and control groups to have parallel recall 
performance is centered in the response generation phase or is random 
error. In the case of recall for two cues together exceeding recall 
the same cues separately, this is intuitively true as well. There are 
fewer responses that fit the constraints of the two cues together than 
fit either of the cues separately. Therefore, given non-asymptotic 
performance, it is to be expected, and it was found, that recall with 
two cues together exceeded cumulative recall for the same cues pre-
sented separately. 
The Adjusted Model 
It is clear from the results of the testing of the existing models 
that none of the proposed models as they stand provide a consistently 
good fit to the data. The power model comes closest. But when that 
model is not allowed to predict better than perfect recall, it assumes 
a shape quite different from the recall curve of the data. 
The aggregate model fails in that it makes the assumption in the 
second cued recall trial that the cues act independently. The data, 
however, clearly point to the fact that retrieval on an earlier trial 
leads to a greater probability of retrieval of that item on a later 
trial no matter what cue is used. By removing the independence of cues 
assumption, a new adjusted model may be created which adequately fits 
the experimental group data no matter which criterion is used. 
The free recall score once again serves as a parameter of the 
model. The probability of recall on the first cued recall trial takes 
into account that both the cue and retrieval on the free recall trial 
may raise the probability that the item is recalled. Mathematically, 
this is stated as 
where P(Ci) = ~ priori probability of association between 
the cue and target, and is recognized as the 
prediction of the additive model. 
On the second cued recall trial, recall may be due to use of the 
new cue or retrieval of i.tems previously recalled on the free recall 
trial and the first cued recall trial. This takes the mathematical 
form 
P(CR2)=P(FR)+2P(Ci)-2P(FR)P(Ci)-[P(Ci)] 
2
+P(FR)[P(Ci)] 2 • 
Finally, the last cued recall takes into account the possibility 
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that the target could be retrieved from any of the previous trials and 
takes the general form 
P(CR1+2)=P(FR)+P(CR1)+P(CR2)-P(FR)P(CR1)-P(FR)P(CRz)-P(CR1)P(CRz) 
+P(FR)P(CR1)P(CR2). 
This formulation may be reduced to the two parameters of the free re-
call score and the ~ priori probability of association between the cue 
and target and thus becomes 
P(CR1+2)=[P(FR)] 3+[P(Ci)] 3-[P(FR)] 3 [P(Ci)] 3 
+3 t P(FR)+P(Ci)+[P(FR~l 3[P(Ci)J 2+[P(FR)] 2[P(Ci)l 3 
-f!(FR)] 2-[P(Ci~J 2-[!(FR~ 3p(ci)-P(FR)[P(Ci)] 3j 
+9([P(FR)] 2P(Ci)+P(FR)[P(Ci)] 2-P(FR)P(Ci) 
-[P(FR)] 2 ~(Ci)] 2 } . 
Predictions using the adjusted model were made on the basis of the 
free recall scores of the subjects in this study and the a priori proba-
bility of association between the cues and targets. The mean probabil-
ity of the data and the predictions of the adjusted model are presented 
in Figure 5. The shapes of the two curves are nearly parallel and are 
quite close together in terms of their numerical values. 
A set of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests was performed 
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on the first, second, and third cued recall trials with the adjusted 
model. In all cases the prediction of the model was not significantly 
different from the data (p <.05). Furthermore, when the absolute values 
of the differences between the data and the predictions of the model 
were summed, these differences proved to be smaller than between the 
data and any other model (2.795 and 2.1842 on the second and third cued 
recall trials respectively). By the criterion of best predictor among 
the models, the adjusted model was equal to the strength and additive 
models on the second cued recall trial and far superior to the other 
models on the third cued recall trial. (The adjusted model predicted 
best in twelve cases, the strength model in six cases, and the additive 
and power models in one case each.) In terms of all the criteria for 
model testing used in this study, the adjusted model was equal or 
superior to the other models in its ability to predict the data. 
In sunrrnary, this study has presented evidence that cuing during 
retrieval can be effective by allowing the person to generate a number 
of responses consistent with the cue and leaving the person with the 
task of either guessing or recognizing one of the responses generated 
by the cue or from previously retrieved items. Further> a mathematical 
model consistent with the assumptions derived from the results of this 
experiment was built which fit the data according to a number of cri-
teria. 
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